

Frontiers of the Franchise: How Partisan Electoral Concerns Shape Public Support for Expanding Voting Rights

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Abstract

How do perceived partisan and social ramifications of voting rights extensions affect public support for expanding the franchise? Through two original survey experiments, I find that partisan electoral concerns consistently and significantly influence Americans' support for expanding the right to vote to citizens with previous felony convictions, non-citizens, and younger Americans. When respondents expect enfranchisement to benefit the opposite party, they are much less likely to support voting rights extensions. However, there is a striking asymmetry in such responses: support is virtually unchanged when enfranchisement is projected to benefit their own party versus when it is projected to be electorally neutral. Meanwhile, respondents from both political parties hold almost identical priors that the Democratic Party would very slightly benefit more from voting rights extensions. The structure of measured priors and the dissociation between perception and behavioral response provide suggestive evidence for a mechanism of electoral threat motivation, whereby partisans react primarily to the prospect of electoral loss rather than gain. This cross-party consensus on the likely beneficiary of franchise expansion helps explain why enfranchisement has become so asymmetrically contested in a polarized environment.

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Introduction

The right to vote is foundational to democracy, yet its boundaries have always been contested and are not a simple binary matter. The franchise comes in degrees — access can be granted with constraints, restricted in practice even when formally held, or denied entirely to some groups. In the United States, ongoing debates over whether and on what terms to extend the franchise to citizens with felony convictions, non-citizens, and younger Americans make these boundaries a live political question. At the same time, recent conflicts over measures such as the SAVE America Act underscore that battles over the franchise are not only about whether new groups should be admitted, but also about how the boundaries of citizen membership can be policed and how access can be constrained even for formally eligible voters.

Scholars have long studied how franchise boundaries change over time, focusing primarily on the strategic calculations of political elites. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue that elites expand the franchise when the costs of exclusion, such as the threat of revolt, outweigh the electoral risks of inclusion. Historical accounts of major milestones in American enfranchisement corroborate this logic: the success of the women’s suffrage movement depended heavily on cross-party elite uncertainty about how women would vote (McConaughy (2013)), and post-Voting Rights Act efforts to suppress Black turnout reflected elite anticipation of partisan consequences (Kousser (2000)). Yet these elite-centered accounts leave a crucial question unanswered: do ordinary voters reason about other people’s voting rights in the same strategic terms? Enfranchisement efforts in the United States have increasingly played out through public referenda and local initiatives, making mass opinion directly consequential. Voters in predominantly Democratic cities have passed measures extending local voting rights to non-citizens, while voters in several Republican-led states have simultaneously passed constitutional amendments restricting voting to citizens only. How the mass public reasons about expanding the franchise therefore has direct consequences for whether and for whom such expansions succeed.

A growing literature on public support for electoral rules suggests that partisan self-interest is a dominant force in how ordinary voters evaluate institutional changes. Democrats and Republicans consistently evaluate proposed reforms — from voter ID requirements to same-day registration to mail-in ballots — more favorably when told those reforms would benefit their party (e.g. Biggers (2019), Bowler and Donovan (2007), Biggers and Bowler (2022), Kane (2017), McCarthy (2019)). Most recently, Alarian and Zonszein (2023) extend this logic directly to enfranchisement, finding that Americans condition their support for noncitizen voting rights on the partisan alignment of those noncitizens. This paper builds directly on their findings by extending the scope of inquiry to additional enfranchisement

targets, investigating the mechanism behind the asymmetric pattern they document but do not explain, and using a conjoint design to examine where principled reasoning about democratic inclusion operates independently of partisan concerns.

This paper pursues these three extensions through two original survey experiments. Both studies examine how Americans decide whether and on what terms to support extending voting rights to three groups at the center of current policy debate: citizens with felony convictions, non-citizens, and citizens between the ages of 16 and 18. These three groups are chosen deliberately. Former felons have previously held full citizenship rights, younger citizens are on the threshold of political membership, and non-citizens reside and contribute to American society while remaining formally excluded. All three are the subject of active enfranchisement debates, and carry very different normative and cultural associations in American politics. While the partisan self-interest literature gives reason to expect conditioning across contexts, the generalizability of the mechanism across groups this normatively distinct from one another is not guaranteed, and finding the same pattern consistently across all three provides stronger evidence for its generality than any single-group study can offer. Study 1 uses a conjoint design in which respondents evaluate policy profiles that vary simultaneously across partisan implications, substantive policy details, and racial composition of newly enfranchised voters. Study 2 uses a different and more subtle partisan signal — short vignettes describing individual members of each target group with cues to their political leanings — and additionally elicits respondents’ prior beliefs about which party would benefit from enfranchisement, enabling a test of competing explanations for a pattern of asymmetric responses conditioned by counter- versus co-partisan alignment¹.

Across both studies, partisan electoral concerns consistently and significantly shape support for enfranchisement, with a striking asymmetry between responses to out-party and in-party gain. Respondents become significantly less likely to support enfranchisement — by 6 to 11 percentage points — when told a policy would benefit the opposing party, relative to when its electoral consequences are described as neutral. This negative response is robust across all three target groups and among both Democratic and Republican respondents. At the same time, respondents show virtually no change in support when told a policy would benefit their own party relative to the neutral condition. This asymmetry of strong negative reactions to out-party gain and near-zero reactions to in-party gain robustly replicates across two independently-run studies with different designs and methods of conveying partisan signals.

¹Such a pattern is also present in Alarian and Zonszein (2023): their national sample shows a counter-partisan effect of approximately 0.23 SDs compared to a co-partisan effect of approximately 0.07 SDs, with the latter statistically significant in only one of two studies — a distinction the authors do not address.

The measurement of priors in Study 2 provides suggestive evidence for electoral threat aversion as the operative mechanism. Both Democratic and Republican respondents hold nearly identical baseline beliefs that the newly enfranchised voters would lean very slightly Democratic, regardless of the target group in question. Both groups update their perceptions modestly in response to partisan signals. Yet these perceptual shifts do not translate into behavioral change on the own-party side: support remains flat regardless of signal strength or direction until out-party benefit appears. This dissociation between perception and behavior, combined with the near-identical prior structure across partisan groups, points toward a single underlying mechanism of electoral threat aversion, consistent with the broader literature on asymmetric responses to loss versus gain (Tversky and Kahneman (1991)).

The conjoint design of Study 1 further reveals that partisan concerns shift respondent support level more than nearly all other substantive details of enfranchisement policies. The range of support attributable to variation in partisan electoral implications exceeds the range attributable to most other policy features, including political knowledge test requirements and election type. The main exceptions are documentation status for non-citizens and incarceration status for felons among Republican respondents. These are precisely the most politically salient boundary cases, and respondents draw firm lines around undocumented individuals and currently incarcerated felons regardless of partisan considerations.


This paper makes three contributions. First, it provides the first systematic investigation of why partisan conditioning takes the asymmetric form documented in prior work. I find suggestive evidence — the structure of measured priors and the dissociation between perception and behavioral responses — for a mechanism of motivation by threat. The design of eliciting priors also yields a substantive finding in its own right: cross-party consensus on the likely Democratic beneficiary of franchise expansion helps explain why enfranchisement has become so asymmetrically contested in a polarized environment. Second, this paper establishes that the asymmetric pattern generalizes across three enfranchisement targets with meaningfully distinct normative and political profiles. Former felons, younger citizens, and non-citizens carry very different cultural and political associations in American politics. Finding the same pattern consistently across all three groups suggests that partisan threat conditioning is a feature of how Americans reason about democratic boundaries broadly rather than being specific to any particular group’s associations. Third, the conjoint design of Study 1 reveals the boundaries of principled reasoning about enfranchisement, suggesting that other than the most salient identity-based boundaries, the terms of enfranchisement policies appear to matter less to public support than their perceived partisan valence.

1 Partisan Self-interest and Enfranchisement

Enfranchisement differs from other electoral rules in ways that make it a theoretically important extension of the partisan self-interest literature. Most studies of electoral rule preferences examine changes that affect how existing voters exercise rights they already hold — registration ease, identification requirements, voting access. Enfranchisement is more fundamental: it defines the boundaries of the demos itself, determining who enters the political community rather than how existing members navigate it. Those who stand to benefit most from enfranchisement cannot themselves vote for it, making the decision rest entirely with the currently enfranchised. This makes enfranchisement a particularly revealing case for studying the depth of partisan conditioning.


The existing literature generates two predictions. First, a large body of work on partisan self-interest finds that individuals condition support for institutional changes on their partisan consequences (Bowler and Donovan (2007), Biggers (2019), McCarthy (2019), Biggers and Bowler (2022), Alarian and Zonszein (2023)), predicting that citizens will favor enfranchisement when their party benefits and oppose it when the other party does. These are the pure strategy predictions illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1: Democratic agent: Pure Principle vs Pure Strategy



Second, beyond simple partisan conditioning, one might expect the form of that conditioning to be asymmetric — reactions concentrated on one side of the partisan signal, for instance, with stronger responses to out-party gain than to in-party gain. Two potential mechanisms could produce this pattern. Under a prior belief account, respondents already hold strong priors that enfranchisement benefits one party, such that signals confirming this produce much more moderate updating than signals contradicting their priors, see Figure 3. Under a threat motivation account, respondents are primarily activated by the prospect of electoral loss rather than gain, and do not respond to information that their own party

Figure 2: Republican Agent: Pure Principle vs Pure Strategy



benefits, see Figure 4.² Distinguishing between them empirically requires knowing where respondents' prior beliefs start before any partisan signal is given, a design challenge this paper directly addresses.

2 Survey Design and Data

I conducted two survey experiments over the course of four months in 2023. Study 1 was fielded from April 13 to May 2, and Study 2 was fielded from July 5 to August 6. The two studies are approved by the INSTITUTION IRB Board, and have registered pre-analysis plans before any data collection occurred³. Data collection was facilitated by Lucid, an online survey company. For details, see Appendix A.

In both experiments, I study how individuals decide to support or not support a policy that extends voting rights to Americans with felony convictions (hereafter, Felon), those who are not US citizens including permanent residents and visa holders (for simplicity hereafter, Non-Citizen), and citizens who are over 16 years old but under 18 years old (hereafter, Young). For simplicity, I refer to these three groups as the “Target Groups”, in order to differentiate from subsamples based on respondent characteristics.


2.1 Study 1

Study 1 is a conjoint survey experiment where respondents are given 10 policy profiles with various characteristics. Each person gets four profiles on Felon, four profiles on Non-Citizen, and two profiles on Young. The order of these blocks is randomized at the respondent level

²The sharp step shown in Figure 4 is abstract and for illustrative purposes. One can think of a threshold that divides no behavioral change versus behavioral changes.

³See Appendix F for pre-analysis plans.

Figure 3: Illustrated Patterns under Strong Priors: Democratic (upper) vs Republican (lower) Agent



— that is, one respondent might get four profiles on Non-Citizen first, four profiles on Felon next, and then two profiles on Young, while another respondent might get two profiles on Young first, four profiles on Non-Citizen next, and then four profiles on Felon. In each of these 10 rounds of policy evaluations, respondents are shown a table-style policy profile that aims to extend voting rights to one of the three target groups. Each policy profile contains attributes of the policy as well as the expected implications of the policy should the proposal get passed. All of these characteristics are randomly drawn from their respective universe of values.⁴ After each policy proposal, respondents are asked whether they would support the proposed policy.


Table 1 shows attribute categories and the possible range of values.

Figure 5 shows an example profile respondents would see on screen. More examples are included in the Appendix B.

After the profile, respondents are asked whether they would support extending voting rights to this aforementioned Target Group, and provided with 5 options: “Definitely yes”,

⁴Randomization is done at the respondent and policy level for all attribute categories other than the implications. To avoid confusion, values of implication attributes are randomized at the respondent and block level, i.e. for a given respondent, policy implications are fixed for one block of policy proposals.

Figure 4: Illustrated Patterns of Motivation: Democratic (upper) vs Republican (lower) Agent



“Probably yes”, “Might or might not”, “Probably not”, “Definitely not”.

2.2 Study 2

In Study 2, I use a more subtle way to manipulate partisan signals to respondents, and instead of straight up telling respondents which political party would benefit, I elicit their perceptions. After answering demographic and policy opinion questions, respondents are shown stories of currently ineligible voters. Each respondent gets one story for each of the three target groups, and the stories would signal one of the following three conditions: a Democrat leaning person (hereafter, Treatment D), a Republican leaning person (hereafter, Treatment R), or a neutral person (hereafter, Control). The order of which target group block gets shown first is randomized, just like in Study 1. Each respondent gets randomly assigned a condition for each target group block. Treatment D and R are constructed based on three policy statements, randomly chosen from a roster of five issues: gun control, undocumented immigration, abortion, transgender rights, and racial equality. See below for the list of statements:

Treatment D:

Table 1: Study 1 Attributes

Attribute	Values
Election type	Local; State and Local; Federal, State, and Local
Political knowledge test	Required; Not required
Implication: political party	Slightly/Significantly increase Democratic/Republican Party's chance of winning elections (4 values); Neutral
Implication: race/ethnicity	White; Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian; Neutral
<i>Felon only:</i>	
Incarceration status	Only after release from prison; No restriction
<i>Non-Citizen only:</i>	
Minimum length of residence in the US	5 years; 1 year; No restriction
Documentation status	Green Card holders only; Green card and valid Visa holders only; No restriction (incl. undocumented individuals)
<i>Young only:</i>	
Enrolled in school/GED	Must be enrolled in any type of school or have completed High School/GED; No requirement

Figure 5: Example Profile — Young

Now suppose you live in a state where those under 18 cannot vote. Further suppose the following policy has been proposed and will have some effects on political Parties and racial/ethnic groups.

Extending Voting Rights to the Young (under 18 and above 16 years old)	
Election Type	Federal, state, and local
Require enrollment at school?	No restriction
Must pass a test on political knowledge?	No
Which political Party would benefit, and how much?	This policy will slightly increase the Democratic Party's chance of winning elections
Which racial/ethnic group would see the biggest turnout increase?	Asian

- we need stricter gun laws and greater control over gun ownership
- there should be a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants
- abortion is a basic human right
- people should be able to identify with the gender of their choosing
- white people benefit from advantages in society that other racial groups do not have

Treatment R:

- we need to prioritize protecting people’s rights to own guns
- those who entered the US illegally should leave the US
- abortion should be illegal
- people should stick to the gender they were born as
- people from all racial groups already have equal access to opportunities

These five issues are picked from a list of highly partisan issues — the initial list is from a 2019 Pew Research Center article.⁵ At first, nine issues that appear to send strong partisan signals are included in the pre-test stage⁶, and are narrowed down to the five that strongly predict respondents’ partisanship.

I use the following names in these stories: Johnny for Felon, Sylvia for Non-Citizen, and Emma for Young. The first two names are picked from a list of racially ambiguous and relatively common names provided in Tzioumis (2018). Given that, the Tzioumis (2018) uses property owner data, and stories for Young are about a 16-year-old high school student, I pick Emma from a list of racially ambiguous baby names.⁷ An example of the stories respondents might see is as follows⁸: *Sylvia was not born in the US, but has been living and working in the US for 5 years as a permanent resident (Green Card holder). Like many other Non-Citizens, she thinks that abortion is a basic human right, and that there should be a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Sylvia also believes that white people*

⁵“In a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions”, Pew Research center, December 17, 2019. <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/12/17/in-a-politically-polarized-era-sharp-divides-in-both-partisan-coalitions/>.

⁶Note that the initial selection takes into the consideration that issue statements need to be believable across all Target Groups on both sides of partisanship.

⁷I used personal judgment as well as online articles for references, e.g. <https://cdn.sisense.com/wp-content/uploads/What-Baby-Names-Tell-Us-About-Ethnic-and-Gender-Trends.pdf>.

⁸More examples are included in Appendix C.

benefit from advantages in society that other racial groups do not have. Like many other Non-Citizens, she wants to make her voice heard by voting in local elections. This example would be coded as Treatment D.

After reading the story, respondents are asked in a random order⁹, about their perception of which political party would benefit more from enfranchising the aforementioned target group as well as whether such enfranchisement would be fair¹⁰. They are then asked whether they would support extending voting rights to the aforementioned Target Group, and are provided with 5 options: “Definitely yes”, “Probably yes”, “Might or might not”, “Probably not”, “Definitely not”.

2.3 Final Sample

Both surveys uses attention-checks and open-ended questions to ensure response quality, as described in the pre-analysis plans. I collected 1,696 valid responses for Study 1, and 2,176 valid responses for Study 2¹¹. Table OA4 in the Appendix shows the composition of the respondents in my studies. The surveys were quota sampled to match the distribution of US adults in terms of gender, race, age, and geographical areas. Overall, the two samples are not far from a nationally representative sample.¹²

The dependent variables are constructed based on the respondent support for enfranchisement. For easier interpretation, I primarily use a dummy (0/1) variable for support — that is, as long as the individual does not explicitly support, such a response would be coded as zero. Referring back to the question wording, “Definitely yes” and “Probably yes” would be coded as **support** = 1, whereas “Might or might not”, “Probably not”, and “Definitely not” would be coded as **support** = 0. Such a measure is more stringent than using a scale normalized to [0, 1] and easier for interpretation. Alternatively, I also code support as a 5-point scale on [0, 1] where “Definitely yes” would translate into **support** = 1 and “Definitely not” would translate into **support** = 0 to differentiate between different intensities of support versus opposition — these cases will be specified throughout the paper.

⁹For detailed wording, see project registration files.

¹⁰I want to note that this question is included mainly to make respondents think about different aspects of enfranchisement, such that they are not led to believe that extending voting rights should be based on which political party would benefit, should the policy change. I do not consider respondents’ answers to this question to be a good measurement of principle related concern over enfranchisement.

¹¹Given funding constraints, I collaborated with a colleague to share survey time when I ran Study 2. Half of the respondents got my block of questions first, and half got my block of questions last. Blocks of questions are separated with questions on policy knowledge or questions on immutable traits.

¹²Quota based on Census QuickFacts: <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045222>. While the Study 1 has a slight oversampling of Republicans, almost all statistical analyses account for respondent party identification.

3 Results

3.1 Partisan electoral concerns shape support for enfranchisement

I first present results from Study 1. Table 2 shows that Democrats are more likely to support an enfranchisement extension policy than Republicans. The unadjusted gap between Democrats and Republicans is 0.22 ($p < 0.001$) — in other words, the mean approval rate among the Democrats is 22 percentage points higher than that among the Republicans.¹³ This gap does not go away when controlling for respondent demographics — see column 3¹⁴. In columns 2 and 4, I control for target groups and which party the policy would benefit respectively — by adding interaction terms I allow Democratic and Republican respondents to react at different rates toward specific target groups or different partisan gain attribute values. The baseline gap does not go away either, indicating that Democrats do appear to be more supportive of extending the franchise overall.

Table 2: Democrats are much more likely to support expanding voting rights

	Support (0/1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	0.22*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.02)
Controls		Target group	Demographics	Party benefit
Observations	16960	16960	16960	16960
R-squared	0.05	0.06	0.14	0.07

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust SE. Democrat is a dummy for respondent partisanship.

Next, I analyze whether congruence between one’s partisan identity and the projected partisan outcome would make a difference in how people decide to support or not support an enfranchisement policy. *Own* indicates that the respondent’s own party would relatively benefit, *Opp* indicates that the opposite party would relatively benefit. The regression compares *Own* and *Opp* to *Neutral*, where respondents are shown that passing this particular extension policy would not electorally favor any political party.

Table 3 reports results from this baseline specification. As expected the gap between *Own* and *Opp* is positive regardless of the partisanship of the respondents ($p < 0.001$ in all specifications). While Democrats are more likely to support an enfranchisement policy, over half of this positive margin (0.27) could be offset if they are shown a policy that

¹³The baseline support rate among the Republican respondents is 24.7%; this makes the baseline support rate among the Democratic respondents 47.0%.

¹⁴This is expected since the assignment of partisan gain attribute values is random.

Table 3: Respondents are much less likely to support enfranchisement policies that would benefit the other political party more

	Support (0/1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Opp	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Constant	0.39*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.02)
Own - Opp	0.11*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Party	All	Dem	Rep
Observations	16960	7550	9410
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.01

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Own* indicates congruence between respondent partisanship and conjoint values for party gain; *Opp* indicates incongruence. *Neutral* is omitted.

benefits the Republican Party (0.15). When a *neutral* or an *own* policy is shown, the average approval rate among the Democrats is 52-54%, whereas when an *opp* policy is shown, the average approval rate is lowered to 39%. This drop is substantively meaningful since the Democrats at the baseline and when exposed to own party gain profiles are majority in support of enfranchisement, but expecting the opposite party gain would lead to majority **not** in support of enfranchisement. Additionally, I observe a striking asymmetry — across the board, people do not seem to react much to their own party benefiting in terms of both the level of statistical significance and the magnitude, but react strongly and negatively to policies that benefit the opposite party. This asymmetry persists throughout different analyses.

Next, I show the similar one-sided patterns persist when I breakdown by target groups — see Table 4. Overall, the average approval rates for extending voting rights to Felon, Non-Citizen, and Young are 42%, 38%, and 35% respectively. Among the three target groups, respondents have higher baseline support for enfranchising Felon than Non-Citizen or Young. This is not surprising since restoring former felons’ political rights has been a more well-known and longstanding political issue in the US. The same pattern of asymmetry is stable across these target groups ($p < 0.001$ in all three cases) — people show strong dislike for policies that benefit the opposite party while not particularly preferring policies that benefit their own party.

Given Democrats and Republicans seem to have different baselines of support, I also

Table 4: Strong negative reaction to opposite party gain persists across all target groups

	Support (0/1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Opp	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Constant	0.42*** (0.02)	0.38*** (0.02)	0.35*** (0.02)
Target Group	Felon	Non-Citizen	Young
Observations	6784	6784	3392
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.01

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Own* indicates congruence between respondent partisanship and conjoint values for party gain; *Opp* indicates incongruence. *Neutral* is omitted.

show results breakdown by partisanship. The results — shown in Tables 5 and 6 — are consistent with the pooled specifications. In general, both Democrats and Republicans show the aforementioned asymmetry across all target groups. The average approval rates for *Neutral* or *Own* policies among the Democrats are around 50% to 58%, and showing a policy that benefits the Republican Party would lower the approval rate by 14 to 16 percentage points. More specifically, when considering whether to extend voting rights to Felon, Democrats are around 26% less likely to approve the policy if such policy would increase the Republican Party’s chance of winning elections. Democrats are around 27% and 32% less likely to approve *Opp* policies for Non-Citizen and Young respectively. Again, this negative reaction toward Republican Party gain would flip the majority in support of expanding the franchise among Democrats.

On the Republican side, the average approval rates for *Neutral* or *Own* policies are around 24% to 33%, and showing a policy that benefits the Democratic Party would lower the approval rate by 6 to 8 percentage points ($p < 0.05$ for columns 1 and 2, $p = 0.08$ for column 3). More specifically, when considering whether to extend voting rights to Felon, Republicans are around 27% less likely to approve the policy if such policy would increase the Democratic Party’s chance of winning elections. Similarly, Republicans are around 31% and 25% less likely to approve *Opp* policies for Non-Citizen and Young respectively.

Overall, the effects of opposite party gain are substantial. The marginal effects of partisan treatments are consistent across the three target groups among both Democratic and Republican respondents. These effects — as percentage change from the baseline — are also very similar across Democrats and Republicans; in other words, the *relative* change is almost the same across respondents from both parties, while the baseline might differ across parti-

Table 5: Strong negative reaction to opposite party gain persists across all target groups — Democrats

	Support (0/1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)
Opp	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.05)
Constant	0.58*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.03)	0.50*** (0.04)
Target Group	Felon	Non-Citizen	Young
Observations	3020	3020	1510
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.02

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Own* indicates congruence between respondent partisanship and conjoint values for party gain; *Opp* indicates incongruence. *Neutral* is omitted.

Table 6: Strong negative reaction to opposite party gain persists across all target groups — Republicans

	Support (0/1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Opp	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Constant	0.30*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)
Target Group	Felon	Non-Citizen	Young
Observations	3764	3764	1882
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.01

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Own* indicates congruence between respondent partisanship and conjoint values for party gain; *Opp* indicates incongruence. *Neutral* is omitted.

san identities. Tables with other attribute values as well as demographic controls included are shown in Appendix, see Tables OA5 and OA6.¹⁵

In Figures 6 and 7, I plot the general empirical pattern of the average level of support for enfranchisement split by Democratic and Republican respondents. The finer-grained treatment coding in these figures allows more transparent analysis that can help distinguish between the two competing explanations for the asymmetric pattern: strong prior belief versus threat motivation.

For Republican respondents (Figure 7), support is statistically indistinguishable across all three own-party and neutral conditions (i.e. Strong R, Slightly R, and Neutral) before dropping sharply and monotonically as Democratic benefit increases. This pattern is consistent with Figure 4(c), and to some extent, Figure 3(d). Under the strong priors account, this flat left-hand side would require Republicans to hold strong priors that enfranchisement benefits their own party. Additionally, even with strong priors, stronger intensity of signals should still move level of support positively, unless the prior is very extreme.


For Democratic respondents (Figure 6), support rises sharply from the Republican-benefit conditions to Neutral, then remains flat across all Democratic-benefit conditions regardless of signal strength. As with Republicans, the absence of any dose-response on the own-party side — here, no additional uptick even at Strong D — is difficult to reconcile with prior updating for the same reason: stronger signals should produce at least marginal movement unless priors are degenerate. I later present what priors Democrats and Republicans actually hold in Section 3.3, which allows a more direct assessment of both accounts.

The same asymmetric responses to *Own* vs *Opp* partisan gain hold in Study 2 as well. Table 7 shows this robust and consistent empirical pattern. Since the partisan signals are more subtly given, I expect the magnitude of shifts to be smaller in Study 2 than what I have observed in Study 1 — recall that in Study 1, I directly told people how enfranchising the new groups would change electoral results. Leveraging the two different designs, I can also reasonably bracket the empirical effects of partisan signals on a dummy for support to be around 8 to 16 percentage points for Democrats, 4 to 8 percentage points for Republicans. Meanwhile, the overall pooled baseline support rate (i.e. *Neutral* signal) is 34% in my Study 2 versus 39% (see Table 3) in Study 1, further validating that these elicited levels of support are substantively meaningful.¹⁶

¹⁵I include unadjusted tables to show a baseline support such that the effect sizes are more easily interpretable. Including controls, by the nature of conjoint design, does not shift the results other than reducing the SEs as well as increasing the R^2 .


¹⁶I do not claim that these estimates have outside validity, but want to note that across two very differently designed surveys, conducted at different times, among different cross-sectional samples, the baseline estimates are not far off from each other.

Figure 6: Level of Support Against Partisan Treatment — Democratic Respondents



Notes: SE clustered at respondent level. 95 % confidence intervals are included. Regressions include demographic controls such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, education level, income level.

Figure 7: Level of Support Against Partisan Treatment — Republican Respondents



Notes: SE clustered at respondent level. 95 % confidence intervals are included. Regressions include demographic controls such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, education level, income level.

Table 7: Asymmetrical responses to partisan cues persist in Study 2

	Support (0/1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.021)	0.004 (0.018)
Opp	-0.055*** (0.014)	-0.076*** (0.022)	-0.036** (0.018)
Constant	0.335*** (0.011)	0.444*** (0.016)	0.226*** (0.013)
Party	All	Dem	Rep
Observations	6526	3240	3286
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Own* indicates congruence between respondent partisanship and treatment; *Opp* indicates incongruence. *Neutral* is omitted.

Controlling for target group in the regression does not change the results much, see Table 8. Similar to the patterns observed in Study 1, Democrats are more likely to support enfranchisement than Republicans, while the asymmetric response to opposite party benefit persists. I also observe that respondents from both parties are much more likely to support enfranchising Felon relative to policies that aim to enfranchise Non-Citizen or Young, a pattern consistent with Study 1.


The empirical pattern of the respondents' level of support for enfranchisement in response to treatments can be summarized in Figures 8 and 9. While the design of Study 2 is different such that signals are less granular in level of intensity, the patterns are nonetheless consistent with Study 1.

Table 8: Asymmetrical responses to partisan cues even after controlling for target groups — consistent with Study 1

	Support (0/1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.020)	0.004 (0.017)
Opp	-0.054*** (0.013)	-0.081*** (0.021)	-0.029* (0.017)
Group: Non-Citizen	-0.232*** (0.012)	-0.244*** (0.019)	-0.220*** (0.016)
Group: Young	-0.276*** (0.012)	-0.324*** (0.018)	-0.229*** (0.016)
Democrat	0.196*** (0.013)		
Constant	0.406*** (0.014)	0.635*** (0.019)	0.374*** (0.018)
Party	All	Dem	Rep
Observations	6526	3240	3286
R-squared	0.12	0.08	0.07


Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Own* indicates congruence between respondent partisanship and treatment; *Opp* indicates incongruence. *Neutral* is omitted. Support (scale) is a 5-point scale on [0,1] where 0 indicates definitely would not support and 1 indicates definitely would support. Target Group Felon is omitted.

Figure 8: Level of Support Against Partisan Treatment — Democratic Respondents



Notes: SE clustered at respondent level. 95 % confidence intervals are included. Regressions include demographic controls such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, education level, income level.

Figure 9: Level of Support Against Partisan Treatment — Republican Respondents



Notes: SE clustered at respondent level. 95 % confidence intervals are included. Regressions include demographic controls such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, education level, income level.


3.2 Principled and partisan reasoning in policy evaluation

In addition to projected partisan gains and losses, I estimate the effects of other factors included in the conjoint. I follow the approach first developed in Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) and estimate the AMCEs for each target group — see Figures 10, 11, and 12. I switch to using the 5-point scale as the dependent variable, in order to allow differentiation between intensity levels of support. Now, support = 0 indicates that the respondent would definitely not support the policy, and support = 1 indicates definitely would support.

The range of movement within the partisan implication attribute exceeds the range within most other attributes across all three target groups, see detailed range of margins in Appendix Talbe OA7.¹⁷ The main exception is incarceration status for Felon — respondents show a strong distaste for extending voting rights to those still serving prison sentences, an effect comparable in magnitude to the partisan signal range. For Non-Citizen, documentation status produces a similarly strong negative response to including undocumented individuals among Republicans. These two exceptions are themselves substantively mean-


¹⁷Strictly speaking, AMCEs are comparable across levels within an attribute but not across attributes (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley (2020)). The comparison here is between the within-attribute ranges rather than point estimates across attributes. In other words, given the current setup, survey-takers appear to have responded more to partisan signals than most of the other attribute categories.

Figure 10: AMCE — Felon



ingful: they represent the most politically salient boundary cases within each target group, where respondents appear to draw firm lines regardless of partisan considerations.


Figure 11: AMCE — Non-Citizen



Beyond these boundary cases, the substantive details of policy proposals produce more modest effects. Respondents show little sensitivity to election type across all three groups. Both Democrats and Republicans weakly prefer policies requiring new voters to pass a political knowledge test. This preference is statistically significant at 5% level for Non-Citizen policies among both partisans, and for Felon policies among Republicans. For Non-Citizen,

both Democrats and Republicans respond positively to minimum residence requirements, while the effect is more prominent among the Republicans. For Young, Republicans prefer requiring school enrollment or GED completion, with Democrats showing the same directional preference but at a smaller magnitude that is weaker statistically. Results on racial group composition are discussed in Appendix D.

Figure 12: AMCE — Young



Taken together, these patterns suggest that respondents do apply principled considerations to the substantive details of enfranchisement, particularly around legal status and

completion of civic obligations. The franchise boundaries respondents draw on principled grounds are real but narrow; partisan threat moves support across a wider range.

3.3 Democrats and Republicans hold almost identical priors

Leveraging the design of Study 2, I am able to elicit respondents’ perception of projected party gain after treatment and before questions about policy support. Firstly, I show that Democratic and Republican respondents hold very similar priors regarding which party would benefit from enfranchisement — that is, the newly eligible voters would be very slightly more likely to vote for the Democratic Party candidates, and post-extension the Democratic Party would gain a very slight advantage in winning elections. Table 9 reports the detailed results. The dependent variable here is a 5-point scale on $[0,1]$ where 0 means the respondent thinks that the new voters would be significantly more likely to vote for the Republican candidate (“Vote” panel) or that allowing the voting rights extension would significantly increase the Republican Party’s chance of winning elections (“Party Gain” panel); 1 means the respondent thinks that the new voters would be significantly more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate (“Vote” panel) or that allowing the voting rights extension would significantly increase the Democratic Party’s chance of winning elections (“Party Gain” panel). The mid-point on the scale — 0.5 — corresponds to respondents holding a neutral outlook. The estimates for neutral treatment are essentially a measure for priors. In this scenario, respondents do not receive any partisan-related information on the representative from the target group. Republican respondents on average hold a prior of 0.59-0.61, whereas Democratic respondents on average hold a prior of 0.60-0.64. Recall that on the 5-point scale, 0.75 indicates that the respondents believe that extending voting rights would benefit the Democratic Party slightly more than the Republican Party. Thus, the measured priors suggest that respondents lean very slightly toward Democratic Party benefit. Moreover, Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 show that the Democrat dummy is small in magnitude and not statistically significant ($p = 0.51$ and $p = 0.45$ respectively). These columns correspond to “Party Gain”, which more precisely captures the projected effects on wins and losses. In general, these measures suggest that Democratic and Republican respondents hold very similar perceptions on partisan ramifications of enfranchisement, in the absence of partisan treatments.

Secondly, I show that treatments do move respondents’ perception of partisan benefits in both directions. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 9 show that marginally reading about a Democrat-leaning person moves the respondent’s perception 0.02 toward Democratic Party benefit, and reading about a Republican-leaning person moves perception 0.04 toward Re-


Table 9: Partisan signals move perception in the expected directions

	Vote		Party Gain	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	0.038*** (0.009)	0.042*** (0.012)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.009 (0.012)
Treatment: D	0.020** (0.008)	0.031** (0.013)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.012)
Treatment: R	-0.039*** (0.008)	-0.044*** (0.012)	-0.040*** (0.008)	-0.035*** (0.011)
Democrat X Treatment: D		-0.022 (0.016)		-0.033** (0.015)
Democrat X Treatment: R		0.009 (0.016)		-0.011 (0.015)
Constant	0.591*** (0.008)	0.589*** (0.010)	0.610*** (0.008)	0.603*** (0.009)
Observations	6528	6528	6522	6522
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. Democrat is a dummy for respondent partisanship. Treatment *Neutral* is omitted.


publican Party benefit. Columns (2) and (4) suggest that Democratic and Republican respondents might respond to partisan treatments at the margin in a slightly different way. Thus I plot the effects of the treatments separately for Democrats and Republicans in Figures 13 and 14. For Republican respondents, both vote choice and party gain perceptions respond symmetrically to treatments in both directions — perceptions move roughly equally whether the signal is Republican- or Democrat-leaning. This symmetric responsiveness is consistent with the threat motivation account: Republican perceptions update in both directions, yet their support only moves in one. For Democratic respondents, perceptions update in both directions, although much more modest but still measurable when exposed to a D signal. Yet this perceptual updating does not translate into behavioral change on the own-party side in Figure 8. This dissociation between perception and behavior is more consistent with a threshold-based threat motivation rather than smooth utility updating. More broadly, the shape of the support responses previously shown in Section 3.1 resembles a step function rather than a smooth gradient: support is essentially flat across all own-party and neutral conditions before dropping sharply once out-party benefit appears, a pattern more in line with a behavioral shift activated by threat.

Figure 13: Measured Perception on Vote (left) and Party Gain (right) against Partisan Treatment — Democratic Respondents



Notes: SE clustered at respondent level. 95 % confidence intervals are included. Regressions include demographic controls such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, education level, income level.

Figure 14: Measured Perception on Vote (left) and Party Gain (right) against Partisan Treatment — Republican Respondents



Notes: SE clustered at respondent level. 95 % confidence intervals are included. Regressions include demographic controls such as age, gender, race and ethnicity, education level, income level.

4 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has examined three dimensions of partisan conditioning in enfranchisement attitudes: whether the asymmetric pattern generalizes beyond noncitizen enfranchisement, what mechanism drives this asymmetry between responses to out-party and in-party gain, and what role substantive policy details play relative to partisan concerns in shaping support. Across two independently-run survey experiments with different designs and different methods of conveying partisan signals, the answers are consistent. Partisan electoral threat shapes support for enfranchisement across all three target groups, including felons, non-citizens, and younger citizens, and does so at magnitudes that, within the conjoint design, exceed the range attributable to most other policy features tested. The asymmetric pattern, strong negative responses to out-party gain and near-zero responses to in-party gain, is more consistent with a motivation by electoral threat than by prior belief updating, though this interpretation remains suggestive rather than conclusive.

These findings have several implications. To contextualize the effect sizes, consider a simple counterfactual: if respondents held neutral expectations about the partisan consequences of enfranchisement rather than the slight Democratic-lean priors observed in Study 2, support for enfranchising felons, non-citizens, and younger citizens would increase by 9 to 10 percentage points, representing 26 to 31 percent increases from baseline.¹⁸ This calculation does not imply that such neutral expectations are accurate; it simply illustrates the scale at which partisan threat is currently constraining public support for democratic inclusion. The fact that both Democrats and Republicans hold nearly identical priors that enfranchisement benefits Democrats slightly helps explain why the issue has become so contested: Republican opposition is reinforced by a broadly shared perception of partisan consequences, while Democratic support is vulnerable to erosion if the partisan valence of newly enfranchised groups shifts.

The conjoint results add a further dimension to this picture. Respondents do apply principled considerations to enfranchisement. Both parties draw firm lines around undocumented individuals and currently incarcerated felons, and both weakly prefer policies that impose some civic threshold on new voters. These preferences suggest that the public holds a rough working theory of who deserves inclusion in the political community, but these principled considerations operate within a range that partisan electoral concerns can easily override. The practical implication is that the terms of enfranchisement policies — how restrictive, how gradual, how conditional — might matter less to public support than the perceived

¹⁸Point estimates are taken from Study 1 where the policy features are more controlled given the conjoint design.

partisan valence of the newly enfranchised group. Advocates of voting rights expansion may therefore find more traction in shaping perceptions of partisan neutrality or uncertainty than in finding more palatable common ground on policy.

This paper also speaks to broader debates about partisanship and democratic norms. Scholars have documented that Americans increasingly rationalize democratic rules and institutional changes through a partisan lens, supporting procedures that advantage their side and opposing those that do not regardless of principled commitments (e.g. Graham and Svobik (2020), Simonovits, McCoy, and Littvay (2022)). My results extend this finding to the most fundamental question in democratic theory: who gets to participate. That partisan threat shapes even this question — not just how existing voters navigate institutions but whether new groups enter the political community at all — suggests that the implications of partisan polarization for democratic inclusion run deeper than the existing literature on electoral rules has captured. Thompson (2022) finds that Republicans anticipate future demographic changes will benefit Democrats electorally, and that this anticipation motivates anti-democratic attitudes. My results complement this finding: it is not only that partisans resist institutional changes that disadvantage them, but that they resist expanding the very boundaries of the right to participate.

The stakes of these dynamics are particularly visible in the current political moment. Since these surveys were fielded in 2023, the landscape of voting rights has shifted considerably. In 2024, eight states passed ballot measures explicitly prohibiting noncitizen voting in their state constitutions.¹⁹ In early 2025, President Trump issued an executive order seeking to limit birthright citizenship, which courts have blocked pending Supreme Court review.²⁰ Meanwhile, the Justice Department has shifted its posture on the Voting Rights Act,²¹ and 16 states have moved to purge voter rolls and tighten registration requirements.²² These developments underscore the paper’s core finding: in a polarized environment where the partisan valence of enfranchisement is salient and widely shared, the boundaries of the franchise are not stable. Public support for democratic inclusion is contingent on perceived electoral consequences, and that contingency creates ongoing vulnerability to restriction as well as expansion. Understanding the mass public’s role in these dynamics is therefore an increasingly urgent research agenda.

¹⁹See “Ballot measures targeting noncitizen voting approved in 8 states”, <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/ballot-measures-targeting-noncitizen-voting-approved-8-states-rcna178888>.

²⁰See “Supreme Court agrees to hear Trump’s challenge to birthright citizenship”, <https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/12/supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-trumps-challenge-to-birthright-citizenship/>.

²¹See “Under Trump, the Justice Department is stepping away from some voting rights cases”, <https://www.npr.org/2025/03/24/nx-s1-5332145/voting-rights-act-1965-justice-department>.

²²See Brennan Center’s 2025 report: <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/state-voting-laws-roundup-2025-review>.

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Appendix

A Survey Process

I conducted two survey experiments over the course of four months in 2023. Study 1 was fielded from April 13 to May 2, and Study 2 was fielded from July 5 to August 6. Both studies obtained approval from the INSTITUTION IRB Board, and have registered pre-analysis plans before any data collection occurred. Anonymized pre-analysis plans are attached along with submission. Both rounds of data collection were administered by Lucid, an online survey company.

Respondents were enrolled online voluntarily and compensated according to their agreements with the platform. At the beginning of the survey, respondents were asked to give their consent; only those who consented to participate were directed into the actual survey. The respondents were able to withdraw their consent at any moment during the survey. No information that would be sufficient to identify individual respondent was collected. See below for the full Study 1 consent form:

You are invited to participate in this research study on voting rights in the United States.

Risk *There is minimal risk associated with this study. Study data will be stored securely, in compliance with INSTITUTION standards, minimizing the risk of confidentiality breach. We cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this study.*

Payment *You will be compensated according to your agreement with the survey company. At the start of the survey, we ask attention check questions. Participants who fail these attention check questions will be routed to the end of the survey and will not be compensated.*

Consent and Privacy *If you have read this form and have decided to participate in this project, please understand your participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. The results of this research study may be presented at scientific or professional meetings or published in scientific journals. Your individual privacy will be maintained in all published and written data resulting from the study.*

Contact *You can contact the research team at AUTHOR EMAIL. If you are not satisfied with how this study is being conducted, or if you have any concerns, complaints, or general questions about the research or your rights as a participant, please contact the INSTITUTION Institutional Review Board (IRB) to speak to someone independent of the research team at INSTITUTION PHONE, or email at INSTITUTION EMAIL.*

You can save or print a copy of this page for your records. Do you agree to participate in this study?

See below for the full Study 2 consent form:

DESCRIPTION: You are invited to participate in a research study on selected contemporary political and social issues related to the military and voting in the United States.

PROCEDURES: You will be asked to read a series of brief prompts and then asked questions pertaining to the prompts. This study contains no audio or video recording. This study contains attention check questions at the start of the survey. Participants who fail these attention check questions will be routed to the end of the survey. Your platform may withhold compensation according to their policies for participants who fail this initial attention check.

TIME INVOLVEMENT: Your participation will take approximately 10-15 minutes.

RISKS AND BENEFITS: The risks associated with this study are minimal. While there always exists the possibility of data breach, study data will be stored securely, in compliance with INSTITUTION standards, minimizing the risk of confidentiality breach. The benefits which may reasonably be expected to result from this study are improved knowledge of the US government and its relationship with society. We cannot and do not guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this study.

PAYMENT: You will be compensated according to your agreement with the survey company.

PARTICIPANT'S RIGHTS: If you have read this form and have decided to participate in this project, please understand your participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. The alternative is not to participate. You have the right to refuse to answer particular questions. The results of this research study may be presented at scientific or professional meetings or published in scientific journals. Your individual privacy will be maintained in all published and written data resulting from the study.

CONTACT INFORMATION: Questions: If you have any questions, concerns or complaints about this research, its procedures, risks and benefits, you can contact the research team at AUTHOR EMAIL, or alternatively at AUTHOR PHONE. Independent Contact: If you are not satisfied with how this study is being conducted, or if you have any concerns, complaints, or general questions about the research or your rights as a participant, please contact the INSTITUTION Institutional Review Board (IRB) to speak to someone independent of the research team at INSTITUTION PHONE, or email at INSTITUTION EMAIL. You are encouraged to print or screenshot this page for your records. By continuing, you indicate your consent to participating in this study, and certify that you are age 18 or older. Thank you very much for participating in our study. We hope that you will pay close attention to the questions on our survey.

B Additional Examples for Study 1 Policy Profiles

Figure OA1: Example Profile — Non-Citizen

Now suppose you live in a state where Non-Citizens cannot vote. Further suppose the following policy has been proposed and will have some effects on political Parties and racial/ethnic groups.

Extending Voting Rights to Non-Citizens	
Election Type	State and local
Minimum Length of county residence required (for registration purposes)	No restriction
Documentation	Green Card holders only
Must pass a test on political knowledge?	No
Which political Party would benefit, and how much?	The policy does not favor any political Party
Which racial/ethnic group would see the biggest turnout increase?	Asian

Figure OA2: Example Profile — Felon

Now suppose you live in a state where Felons and Ex-Felons cannot vote. Further suppose the following policy has been proposed and will have some effects on political Parties and racial/ethnic groups.

Extending Voting Rights to Felons or Ex-Felons	
Election Type	Local
Incarceration status	No restriction (incl. while serving time in prison)
Must pass a test on political knowledge?	No
Which political Party would benefit, and how much?	The policy does not favor any political Party
Which racial/ethnic group would see the biggest turnout increase?	Hispanic/Latino

C Additional Examples for Study 2 Information Treatments

Below are two more examples to show how statements are randomly picked from issue rosters for partisan signals, and how neutral signals are set up.

A Neutral Signal for Felon: *Johnny just finished serving time for a felony charge. He is actively looking for a job and trying to get back on his feet. Like many former felons, he cares about politics and wants to make his voice heard by voting in elections.*

A R Signal for Young: *Emma is a 16-year-old high school student. She is an active member in her school's student government. Like many people her age, Emma thinks that people from all racial groups already have equal access to opportunities, and that people should stick to the gender they were born as. She also believes that those who entered the US illegally should leave the US. Like many people her age, she wants to make her voice heard by voting in elections.*

D Racial group based strategic concerns are less prominent than partisan concerns

I also investigate the possibility of strategic concern over racial and ethnic identities. A strand of literature in race and politics have discussed how people's in vs out identity can shape their policy preferences and electoral behaviors (e.g. White (2007), Peterson (2014), Jardina (2021)). Recall in Study 1, one of the conjoint attributes is the racial/ethnic group gain — policy profiles have a row for “which racial/ethnic group would see the biggest turnout increase”. I explore two ways of incorporating race/ethnicity match into my analyses:

(i.) exact race match. For example, a Black respondent seeing a policy that would result in the biggest relative increase of the Black voter base would be coded as $In = 1$ and $Out = 0$. A policy that would result in the biggest relative increase of any other racial group among voters would be coded as $In = 0$ and $Out = 1$. Policies that do not favor any racial group would be coded as $In = 0$ and $Out = 0$.

(ii.) white vs non-white match. For example, a Black respondent seeing a policy that would result in the biggest relative increase of the Black or Hispanic or Asian voter base would be coded as $In = 1$ and $Out = 0$. A policy that would result in the biggest relative increase of the White voter base would be coded as $In = 0$ and $Out = 1$. Policies that do not favor any racial group would be coded as $In = 0$ and $Out = 0$.

The latter specification takes into consideration that most survey respondents are indeed White, and it is especially difficult to enroll non-White Republicans. The results do not exhibit the same style of asymmetry as projected partisan consequences — see Table OA1. Respondents do show more support for policies that would benefit their racial/ethnic in-groups, yet the coefficients are not always statistically significant. Notice that in this scenario, people seem to respond more to positive signals — that is, compared to the partisan strategy where people strongly dislike opposite party gain but are generally nonchalant toward own party gain, people like own racial/ethnic group gain, but are generally nonchalant toward

out-group gain.¹ Notably among Republicans, racial group congruence based on white vs non-white match would move respondents' level of support positively at a magnitude that is larger than partisan incongruence would move the level of support in the other direction.

Table OA1: Effects of Race Congruence on Support for Enfranchisement

	Race/Ethnicity Match			White/Non-White Match		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Own	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Opp	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
In (Race/Ethnicity)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)			
Out (Race/Ethnicity)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)			
In (White/Non-White)				0.10*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)
Out (White/Non-White)				0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03** (0.02)
Constant	0.39*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.02)	0.54*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.02)
Party	All	Dem	Rep	All	Dem	Rep
Observations	16960	7550	9410	16960	7550	9410
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Neutral* partisan and racial treatments are omitted.

Furthermore, I allow differential reactions to race based on the corresponding partisan gain by adding interaction terms between party gain and race-based gain in Table OA2. Though most of the coefficients are not statistically significant, I observe that for instance, Democrats favor policies that benefit both the Democratic Party and their own racial group (based on white vs non-white, see column 5) the most, and dislike policies that benefit both the Republican Party and the out racial group the most. Overall, there still exists a baseline negative reaction to opposite party gain. These results confirm that the strong and negative reaction to opposite party gain is not driven by differential treatment to racial group signals conditioned on the partisan signal.

Lastly, to fully allow different responses from respondents across racial/ethnic groups, I also show effects of individual attribute values by respondent race in Table OA3. Overall, non-White respondents have higher average support for enfranchisement. The results are less clear-cut given the sample size limitation.

¹I note that unlike partisan gain signals that are direct inverses of each other (i.e. Republican gain is essentially Democratic loss), racial group gains could be more noisy to respondents. There is more to be unpacked in the race-based strategy base in future studies.

Table OA2: Effects of Race Congruence on Support for Enfranchisement

	Race/Ethnicity Match			White/Non-White Match		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Own	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)
Opp	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.14** (0.07)	-0.10** (0.04)
In (Race-based)	0.06 (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)
Out (Race-based)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04)
Own X In	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)
Own X Out	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)
Opp X In	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)
Opp X Out	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)
Constant	0.37*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.04)
Party	All	Dem	Rep	All	Dem	Rep
Observations	16960	7550	9410	16960	7550	9410
R-squared	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Neutral* partisan and racial treatments are omitted.

Table OA3: Effects of Racial Group Gain on Support for Enfranchisement — by Respondent Race

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Own	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.09)
Opp	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.17)
Democrat	0.25*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.13*** (0.04)	0.30* (0.15)
Asian	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.13)
Black	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.22)
Hispanic/Latino	-0.03* (0.02)	0.04 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.17 (0.22)
White	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.17 (0.15)
Constant	0.27*** (0.02)	0.45*** (0.07)	0.44*** (0.06)	0.33*** (0.09)
Respondent Race	White Only	Black	Hispanic/Latino	Asian
Observations	12490	1460	2460	130
R-squared	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.10

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Neutral* partisan and racial treatments are omitted. Democrat is a dummy for respondent partisanship.

E Additional Tables and Figures

Table OA4: Descriptive Statistics of Respondent Composition

	Study 1		Study 2	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
<i>Political Party:</i>				
Democrat	755	44.5	1,080	49.6
Republican	941	55.5	1,096	50.4
<i>Race/Ethnicity:</i>				
Non-Hispanic White	1,249	73.6	1,371	63.0
Black	146	8.6	300	13.8
Hispanic	246	14.5	356	16.4
<i>Age Bins:</i>				
18 - 34	366	21.6	547	25.1
35 - 54	576	34.0	73	34.0
55 and older	754	44.5	890	40.9
<i>Gender:</i>				
Male	692	40.8	1,068	49.1
Female or Non-binary	1,004	59.2	1,108	50.9
<i>Education:</i>				
Less than BA	997	58.8	1,418	65.2
BA/BS	387	22.8	507	23.3
Graduate degrees	312	18.4	251	11.5
<i>Income:</i>				
Less than \$25k	297	17.5	451	20.7
\$25,000 - \$49,999	404	23.8	677	31.1
\$50,000 - \$74,999	340	20.0	514	23.6
\$75,000 - \$150,000	481	18.4	423	19.4
Over \$150k	174	10.3	109	5.0

Notes: Sample include US citizen adults who self-identify as partisans (including those who leans toward either the Democratic or Republican parties).

Table OA5: Strong negative reaction to opposite party gain persists across all target groups
— Democrats

	Support (0/1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Opp	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.04)
Target Group	Felon	Non-Citizen	Young
Observations	3020	3020	1510
R-squared	0.11	0.18	0.19

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Own* indicates congruence between respondent partisanship and conjoint values for party gain; *Opp* indicates incongruence. *Neutral* is omitted. Regressions control for other attribute values as well as demographics including gender, age, race and ethnicity, education, income level.

Table OA6: Strong negative reaction to opposite party gain persists across all target groups
— Republicans

	Support (0/1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Own	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Opp	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)
Target Group	Felon	Non-Citizen	Young
Observations	3764	3764	1882
R-squared	0.13	0.13	0.14

Notes: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. SE clustered at respondent level. *Own* indicates congruence between respondent partisanship and conjoint values for party gain; *Opp* indicates incongruence. *Neutral* is omitted. Regressions control for other attribute values as well as demographics including gender, age, race and ethnicity, education, income level.

Table OA7: Within-Attribute Ranges of Marginal Means by Target Group and Respondent Party

	Democrat	Republican
<i>Panel A: Felon</i>		
Partisan implication	0.17	0.12
Election type	0.05	0.01
Knowledge test	0.00	0.03
Incarceration status	0.11	0.13
Racial group	0.09	0.07
<i>Panel B: Non-Citizen</i>		
Partisan implication	0.15	0.09
Election type	0.02	0.01
Knowledge test	0.03	0.02
Documentation status	0.10	0.09
Residency requirement	0.04	0.05
Racial group	0.07	0.03
<i>Panel C: Young</i>		
Partisan implication	0.18	0.10
Election type	0.06	0.02
Knowledge test	0.03	0.03
School enrollment	0.02	0.03
Racial group	0.08	0.05

Notes: Each cell reports the within-attribute range of marginal means (highest minus lowest predicted probability of support). Marginal means are estimated from the conjoint regression with demographic controls, clustered standard errors at the respondent level. Democrat and Republican subsamples are analyzed separately.

F Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP)

Pre-analysis Plan for a Survey Experiment on Support toward Extending Voting Rights in the US

Author

April 12th, 2023

1 Introduction

This document outlines a pre-analysis plan for evaluating a survey experiment to be administered through Lucid. It pre-commits the authors to testing the hypotheses listed, using the empirical approach detailed below. This plan has been written prior to any data collection and analysis.

2 Study Design and Procedures

The survey experiment will examine factors influencing US citizens' support for extending voting rights to currently ineligible voters - I focus on three target groups: Non-Citizens, US Citizens with felony convictions (hereafter, Felon/Ex-felon), and US Citizens who are over 16 years old but under 18 years old (hereafter, the Young). I aim to get a sample of 1,500 US citizens who are 18 years old or older; I aim to have a sample of respondents who either identify as Democrats/Republicans, or consider themselves as Independents or having no party preferences but identify as leaning closer to the Democratic/Republican Party. In short, I aim to have a sample of mostly "partisans". Lucid, an online survey company, will facilitate fielding the survey.

After answering demographic and political knowledge questions, respondents are shown policy proposals that aim to extend voting rights to one of the three target groups. They are asked whether they support the policy: "Would you support this policy?" They are given options: Definitely yes, Probably yes, Might or might not, Probably not, Definitely not.

Each respondent gets one block of four Non-Citizen policies, one block of four Felon/Ex-felon policies, and one block of two the Young policies. The order of these blocks is randomized. Each policy profile contains attributes of the policy as well as expected implications of the policy should the policy get passed. All of these characteristics are randomly drawn from their respective universe of values.¹

The other attributes include:

- Election Type
- Must pass a test on political knowledge?
- Which political Party would benefit from this policy?
- Which racial/ethnic group would see the biggest turnout increase?

Specific to Non-Citizen profiles:

¹Randomization is done at respondent and policy level for all attribute categories other than the implications; to avoid confusion, values of implication attributes are randomized at respondent and block level, i.e. for a given respondent, policy implications are fixed for one block of policy proposals.

- Minimum Length of residence in the US required for voter registration
- Documentation status

Specific to Felon/Ex-felon profiles:

- Incarceration status

Specific to the Young profiles:

- Require either enrollment at school or High School degree/GED?

The differential level of support could come from how salient each issue is - for example, because felon voting rights has been a political issue for a longer period of time, people might have more information and hence prior opinions regarding felon voting compared to the other two target groups.

I want to study when people consider extending voting rights, whether and to which degree their decisions involve strategic partisan concerns. On the one hand, our current political environment is increasingly polarized and hence it is reasonable for voters to support policies that benefit their own political parties. On the other hand, historically extending voting franchise is always associated with the narrative of “doing the right thing” and “justice and fairness”; whether to extend voting rights could be a matter of principle to US citizens.

In general, I would treat support as a zero/one dummy, while reserving the option of decomposing it into a more detailed scale on $[0, 1]$ constructed from the 5 options: Definitely yes, Probably yes, Might or might not, Probably not, Definitely not.

3 Analysis

I hypothesize that support for extending voting rights have a baseline difference among Republicans and Democrats.

H1: Democrats overall are more likely to support extending voting rights than Republicans.

R1: Are Democrats/Republicans more likely to support certain target groups versus others?

R2: Overall are respondents more likely to support a policy that benefits their own political parties?

Below table shows mean of support:

	Implication: which party benefits		
	Democrat	Republican	Neutral
Democrat Respondent	DD	DR	DN
Republican Respondent	RD	RR	RN

Descriptively, I will show the magnitude of change between different implications.

R3: How much does partisan strategic concern affect people’s support for a policy?

The baseline regression:

$$Support_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 Own_{ij} + \beta_2 Opp_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Where i is the individual respondent, and j is the policy index. *Own* indicates that the respondent’s own party would benefit, *Opp* indicates that the opposite party would benefit.

Scenario	β_1	β_2	$\beta_1 - \beta_2$
S1	Positive	Negative	Positive
S2	Positive	Null	Positive
S3.1	Positive	Positive	Positive
S3.2			Null
S4.1	Negative	Negative	Positive
S4.2			Null
S5	Negative	Null	Negative
S6.1	Null	Null	Positive
S6.2	Null	Null	Null
S7	Null	Negative	Null

S1: strategic. Respondents prefer own party gain over neutral, and neutral over the other party gain.

S2: strategic. Respondents think of strategy as upholding policies that benefit their own party, but do not consider the other party's loss as a relative gain for their own party.

S3.1: weakly strategic. Respondents comparatively prefer policies that benefit their own party more.

S3.2: non-strategic.

S4.1: weakly strategic. Respondents prefer neutral policies, but least favor policies that benefit the other party.

S4.2: non-strategic. Respondents prefer policies that do not benefit a particular party.

S5: non-strategic.

S6.1: weakly strategic.

S6.2: non-strategic.

S7: strategic. Respondents think of strategy as oppressing policies that benefit the other party.

I will explore heterogeneity by running similar specifications split by respondent party ID:

$$Support_{ijk} = \alpha_k + \beta_{k1}Own_{ijk} + \beta_{k2}Opp_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

Where $k \in \{Republican, Democrat\}$.

I will explore heterogeneity by running similar specifications split by target group:

$$Support_{ijg} = \alpha_g + \beta_{g1}Own_{ijg} + \beta_{g2}Opp_{ijg} + \varepsilon_{ijg}$$

Where $g \in \{Non - Citizen, Felon/Ex - Felon/Young\}$.

I will also add in other conjoint attributes:

$$Support_{ijk} = \alpha_k + \beta_{k1}Own_{ijk} + \beta_{k2}Opp_{ijk} + \gamma_k X_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

Where $k \in \{Republican, Democrat\}$, and X_{ijk} is the vector containing other attributes. These specifications will be run at respondent party X target group level.

I reserve the option of pooling data over target groups or over respondent party ID, and estimate interactions terms. For example, in the case of pooling over party ID:

$$Support_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 Own_{ij} + \beta_2 Opp_{ij} + \beta_3 Dem_i + \beta_4 (Own_{ij} * Dem_i) + \beta_5 (Opp_{ij} * Dem_i) + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Where Dem is the respondent Democrat dummy.

R4: Within each target group, what are the factors that influence Democrats/Republicans' support for extending voting rights?

I will calculate the average marginal component effect within each target group, split by respondent partisanship.

$$Support_{ij} = \alpha + \beta X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Here, X_{ij} is a vector containing all attributes of individual i 's j th policy, including the implications. For each of the 6 subsections of data (i.e. D or R + Non-Citizen or Felon/Ex-felon or the Young), I will estimate the vector β .

R5: Are people more likely to support policies that benefit their racial/ethnic groups more?

I will explore how race/ethnicity based political benefit affects one's support for extending voting rights. Specifically, I will investigate the effect of

- which racial/ethnic group benefits
- whether the respondent's own racial/ethnic group benefits

I will also explore how these effects could vary by respondent party ID.

Pre-analysis Plan for a Survey Experiment on Voting Rights Enfranchisement in the US

Author

June 28th, 2023

1 Introduction

This document outlines a pre-analysis plan for evaluating a survey experiment to be administered through Lucid. It pre-commits the authors to testing the hypotheses listed, using the empirical approach detailed below. This plan has been written prior to any data collection and analysis.

2 Study Design and Procedures

The survey experiment will examine factors influencing US citizens' support for extending voting rights to currently ineligible voters - I focus on three target groups: Non-Citizens, US Citizens with felony convictions (hereafter, Felon/Ex-felon), and US Citizens who are over 16 years old but under 18 years old (hereafter, the Young). I aim to get a sample of 2,000 - 2,500 US citizens who are 18 years old or older. Lucid, an online survey company, will facilitate fielding the survey.

After answering demographic and policy opinion questions, respondents are shown stories of currently ineligible voters. Each respondent gets one story for each of the three target groups, and the stories would signal one of the following three conditions: a Democrat leaning person (hereafter Treatment D), a Republican leaning person (hereafter Treatment R), or a neutral person (hereafter Control). The order of which target group block gets shown first is randomized. Each respondent gets randomly assigned a condition for each target group block.

Treatment D and R are constructed based on three policy statements, randomly chosen from a roster of five issues: gun control, undocumented immigration, abortion, transgender rights, and racial equality. See below for the list of statements:

Treatment D:

- we need stricter gun laws and greater control over gun ownership
- there should be a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants
- abortion is a basic human right
- people should be able to identify with the gender of their choosing
- white people benefit from advantages in society that other racial groups do not have

Treatment R:

- we need to prioritize protecting people's rights to own guns

- those who entered the US illegally should leave the US
- abortion should be illegal
- people should stick to the gender they were born as
- people from all racial groups already have equal access to opportunities

Below is an example for Treatment D of target group Non-Citizen:

Sylvia was not born in the US, but has been living and working in the US for 5 years as a permanent resident (Green Card holder). Like many other Non-Citizens, she thinks that abortion is a basic human right, and that there should be a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Sylvia also believes that white people benefit from advantages in society that other racial groups do not have. Like many other Non-Citizens, she wants to make her voice heard by voting in local elections.

The attached questionnaire has full details on these stories.

After the story passage, the respondents answer questions regarding their perceptions of the strategic and moral aspect of extending voting rights. For example, in the Non-Citizen block, respondents get the following questions in a random order:

- In general, if Non-Citizens are allowed to vote in local elections, do you think they will be more likely to support the Republican or Democratic Party?
5-point scale from “Much more likely Republican” to “Much more likely Democratic”.
- In general, if Non-Citizens are allowed to vote in local elections, do you expect the election results to change? Do you think allowing Non-Citizens to vote in local elections would...?
5-point scale from “Significantly increase the Republican Party’s chance of winning elections” to “Significantly increase the Democratic Party’s chance of winning elections”.
- In general, do you think it is fair to include Non-Citizens in the voting process in the US?
5-point scale from “Extremely fair” to “Extremely unfair”.

Then, the respondents are asked whether they would support a policy that extends or restricts voting rights.

- *Would you support a policy that allows Non-Citizens to vote in local elections in the US?*
- *Would you support a policy that automatically restores voting rights of citizens with past felony convictions in the US?*
- *Would you support lowering the legal voting age to 16 in the US?*

The survey has built-in attention check and bot check questions that ensure the quality of responses. Throughout the survey, I ask open-ended questions, and to ensure quality, I will exclude respondents that repeatedly leave nonsensical or offensive comments throughout the whole survey. I also want to note that I will be sharing the survey time with a colleague - see details in the questionnaire.¹

3 Analysis

H1: Respondents would be more likely to report perception of Democratic Party gain if they were shown stories that signal a Democrat leaning person; similarly, respondents would be more likely to report perception of Republican Party gain if they were shown stories that signal a Republican leaning person.

¹Half of the respondents will get my survey blocks first, and half of the respondents will get my colleague’s survey blocks first. Demographic and policy opinion questions are sprinkled through the survey and in-between our blocks. Other than the order, the two surveys administered are identical.

$$Perception_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 Signal_{ij}^D + \beta_2 Signal_{ij}^R + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Where i is the individual respondent, and j is the target group block index. $Signal^D$ is a dummy for receiving a story that signals a Democrat leaning person; $Signal^R$ is a dummy for receiving a story that signals a Republican leaning person. Perception is a scale between 0 and 1, with 0 meaning “Much more likely Republican” or “Significantly increase the Republican Party’s chance of winning elections”, and 1 meaning “Much more likely Democratic” or “Significantly increase the Democratic Party’s chance of winning elections”. I reserve the option of combining the two scales. I reserve the option of using a 0/1 dummy on the LHS.

By H1, I expect to see $\beta_1 - \beta_2 > 0$.

R1: How much does partisan strategic concern affect people’s support for a policy?

The baseline regression:

$$Support_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 Own_{ij} + \beta_2 Opp_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Where Own indicates that the respondent getting a condition that signals their own party, Opp indicates that condition would signal their opposite party. While the perception is not strictly randomized, I reserve the option of running the specification with Own indicating that the respondent perceives own party gain, Opp indicating that the respondent perceives opposite party gain. For this latter specification, I do not intend to claim causality. Support is a scale between 0 and 1, with 0 meaning “Definitely no”, and 1 meaning “Definitely yes”. I reserve the option of using a 0/1 dummy on the LHS.

Scenario	β_1	β_2	$\beta_1 - \beta_2$
S1	Positive	Negative	Positive
S2	Positive	Null	Positive
S3.1	Positive	Positive	Positive
S3.2			Null
S4.1	Negative	Negative	Positive
S4.2			Null
S5	Negative	Null	Negative
S6.1	Null	Null	Positive
S6.2	Null	Null	Null
S7	Null	Negative	Null

S1: strategic. Respondents prefer own party gain over neutral, and neutral over the other party gain.

S2: strategic. Respondents think of strategy as upholding policies that benefit their own party, but do not consider the other party’s loss as a relative gain for their own party.

S3.1: weakly strategic. Respondents comparatively prefer policies that benefit their own party more.

S3.2: non-strategic.

S4.1: weakly strategic. Respondents prefer neutral policies, but least favor policies that benefit the other party.

S4.2: non-strategic. Respondents prefer policies that do not benefit a particular party.

S5: non-strategic.

S6.1: weakly strategic.

S6.2: non-strategic.

S7: strategic. Respondents think of strategy as oppressing policies that benefit the other party.

I will explore heterogeneity by running similar specifications split by respondent party ID:

$$Support_{ijk} = \alpha_k + \beta_{k1} Own_{ijk} + \beta_{k2} Opp_{ijk} + \varepsilon_{ijk}$$

Where $k \in \{Republican, Democrat\}$.

I will explore heterogeneity by running similar specifications split by target group:

$$Support_{ijg} = \alpha_g + \beta_{g1}Own_{ijg} + \beta_{g2}Opp_{ijg} + \varepsilon_{ijg}$$

Where $g \in \{Non - Citizen, Felon/Ex - Felon, Young\}$.

I reserve the option of pooling data over target groups or over respondent party ID, and estimate interactions terms. For example, in the case of pooling over party ID:

$$Support_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1Own_{ij} + \beta_2Opp_{ij} + \beta_3Dem_i + \beta_4(Own_{ij} * Dem_i) + \beta_5(Opp_{ij} * Dem_i) + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Where Dem is the respondent Democrat dummy.

R2: Instead of defining congruence based on partisan signal match, I could also use policy-based match. The base specification in R1 would be re-written as:

$$Support_{ij} = \alpha + \beta PolicyMatch_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Where $PolicyMatch$ would indicate how closely the respondent's policy stances match with the statements provided in the story.

I could repeat analysis mentioned under R1 in this context.

R3: Apart from partisanship, what other factors that would affect one's perception and/or degree of support toward extending voting rights?

$$Perception_{ij} = \alpha + \gamma X_{ij} + \beta_1 Signal_{ij}^D + \beta_2 Sginal_{ij}^R + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Where X_{ij} is a vector containing possible moderators such as demographics, I will estimate vector γ .

$$Support_{ij} = \alpha + \gamma X_{ij} + \beta_1 Signal_{ij}^D + \beta_2 Sginal_{ij}^R + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Similar specification for support.

Finally, I reserve the option of running specifications in the following subsets of the data:

- Since I share my survey time with a colleague, I could run specifications with the portion of the data where my blocks get asked first.
- I could also run specifications with only the first target group for each respondent.